Andreas Nohn
Diplom Wirtschaftsmathematiker, PhD, research fellow
Contact:
tel. +49 40 42838 4462 (W)
fax: +49 40 42838 6329
email: nohn (at) econ.uni-hamburg.de
address: Universität Hamburg, Institute of SocioEconomics, VMP 5, room 2068, D-20146 Hamburg
Research interests:
- voting
- bargaining
- power
Current Projects in PCRC:
1. Monotonicity of Power in Weighted Voting Games with Restricted Communication (with J.M. Alonso-Meijide and S. Napel). We propose several monotonicity concepts in either weights or communication possibilities of players and investigate whether different solution concepts satisfy these properties.
2. Veto Players and Non-Cooperative Foundations of Power in Coalitional Bargaining. I show that, in coalitional bargaining of the Baron-Ferejohn type, veto players either hold all power and share it proportional to their recognition probabilities, or hold no power at all. This yields an impossibility theorem characterizing a class of power indices for which no non-cooperative support is possible.
3. Coalitional Bargaining with Markovian Proposers. I extend the coalitional bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) to non-independent proposers, investigate the effects of dependency and elaborate the possibility of non-cooperative support for power indices.
4. A Dynamic Public Good Index. I propose a variant of the Public Good Index which endogenizes the probability distribution that defines which minimal winning coalition arises. By a suitable mechanism for finding these probabilities, the dynamic PGI is likely to overcome the violations of local and global monotonicities of the original PGI.