Program of the PCRC seminar, spring 2010

On Wednesdays from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m., room 368, Publicum

3.2. Aleksandra Maslowska Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (with J. Jokinen)                                        
10.2. Hannu Autto Selective Incentives and Structural Power  
17.2 Achillefs Papageorgiou Finnish party positions in 2007: A matter of equilibrium or projection?  
24.2. Simo Kalla Sequential Auctions with Bidder Entry and Exit  
3.3. Antti Pajala Properties of Ternary Voting Games  
10.3. Hannu Salonen On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Games  (with H. Vartiainen)  
17.3. Marko Ahteensuu The Deficit Model and Its Criticisms: The Case of Genetically Engineered Organisms  
24.3. Rudolf Seising Warren Weaver as a Mathematician and Science Administrator in 20th Century  
31.3. Hannu Vartiainen Auction design without commitment  
7.4. Heikki Pursiainen Estimation of Private Cartel Damages: The Finnish Road Construction Case. A preliminary research plan. (with J. Tukiainen and V. Mälkönen)  
14.4. Eerik Lagerspetz Intensity Comparisons, the Borda rule, and Democratic Theory  
21.4. Arvi Pakaslahti Priority weighted expected utility or expected priority weighted utility?  
28.4. Olli Lappalainen Testing Economic Theories -  Models and Experiments  
5.5

Helena Keinänen

An Algorithm for Generating Nash Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games  
12.5. Aleksandra Maslowska Voting procedure in the European Central Bank (with M.Maunula)  
19.5. J.Virrankoski

V. Korpela
Recruiting lag, unemployment, and wages

Contracting in a renegotiation robust way
 
26.5. Hannu Nurmi


Juha Helin

Preparing for SAB-meeting


TBA

 
2.6. Stefan Napel Strategic vs. Non-strategic Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers: The Consultation Procedure  
 

18.05.2010 15:35 Hannu Autto